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Abstract
I revisit the Rubinstein (1982) model for the classic problem of price hag-
gling and show that bargaining can become a “trap,” where equilibrium leaves
one party strictly worse off than if no transaction took place (e.g., the equilib-
rium price exceeds a buyer’s valuation). This arises when one party is impa-
tient about capturing zero surplus (e.g., Rubinstein’s example of fixed bargaining
costs). Augmenting the protocol with unilateral exit options for responding bar-
gainers generally removes the trap.
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1 Introduction
The seminal bargaining protocol proposed by Rubinstein (1982) has two parties alter-
nate in offering shares x ∈ [0, 1] of the surplus until an offer is accepted. Considering
the classic version of the problem of price haggling by a seller S and a buyer B with
quasi-linear utility and monetary valuations vi ≥ 0 for the good to be traded, such that
vB > vS, the restriction to surplus shares translates into the restriction that price offers
p are from the range [vS, vB]. Contrary to the intuition that this is without loss of gen-
erality, I show that there are preferences covered by Rubinstein’s assumptions for which
equilibrium implies a price agreement outside of this surplus division range. Hence, for
one of the two parties, bargaining constitutes a trap: Its outcome is not individually
rational, and this party would be better off avoiding the transaction altogether.
The bargaining trap occurs for preferences such that some party is willing to pay
to avoid delaying even a “zero-surplus agreement” (e.g., for the buyer this means price
p = vB), and it is then a consequence of the protocol’s assumption that the only way to
get out of the bargaining is by reaching agreement.1 As I demonstrate, this potentially
results in one party’s having extreme bargaining power (or rather “superpower”) over
the other. Bargaining is then not just about the surplus but also about ending it. In
this sense, restricting offers to surplus shares removes a key strategic element.
I illustrate the bargaining trap specifically for Rubinstein’s example of fixed bargain-
ing costs, where my only modification to his model is to extend the range of price offers
to [vS − l, vB + l], for some l ≥ 0 (for l = 0, the model is a special case of Rubinstein,
1982). I obtain the extreme result that if the seller has an arbitrarily small advan-
tage in terms of bargaining costs and makes the first offer, then the unique equilibrium
has immediate (hence efficient) agreement on the maximal possible price p = vB + l,
for any l. As this maximal price becomes large (l → ∞), the seller’s (resp., buyer’s)
payoff approaches plus (resp., minus) infinity, regardless of who gets to make the ini-
tial offer.2 While the bargaining outcome is efficient, the buyer’s greater bargaining
costs turn her into a money pump for the seller because she cannot get out of the
bargaining without the latter’s agreement. This implies that no matter how large the
surplus to be shared, the buyer would rather avoid the transaction altogether than to
1Relatedly, Shaked (1994, p. 421) describes this assumption as follows: “(...) the two agents are
doomed to continue bargaining forever unless they reach an agreement.”
2Interestingly, in experimental implementations, bargaining with such fixed costs has produced re-
sults much better in line with equilibrium predictions than bargaining with discounting; see Rapoport,
Weg, and Felsenthal (1990), and Weg and Zwick (1991), as well as the survey by Roth (1995).
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bargain with the seller. Taking this selection into account, the bargaining mechanism
becomes a source of strong inefficiency, despite perfect information. Indeed, when both
parties have identical costs, the (stationary) equilibrium multiplicity shown in Rubin-
stein (1982, Conclusion I, p. 107) extends with the offer range, thus permitting an even
starker bargaining trap: Non-stationary equilibria exist in which the agreement’s delay
costs more than the entire surplus, so that both parties are strictly worse off than by
not transacting at all.
I then clarify that fixed bargaining costs preferences are in fact merely an alternative
representation of exponential discounting preferences (see also Fishburn and Rubinstein,
1982). The specific illustration of the bargaining trap is therefore not at all about how
delay as such is discounted.3 Rather, as indicated above, it relies on (at least) one
party’s strict preference to reach agreement on a “zero-surplus agreement” immediately
over doing so with delay. In terms of exponentially discounted utility from agreed shares
δt ·u (x), this means u (0) > 0, and I show how such preferences capture haggling costs,
beyond “pure” time preferences.
Finally, I show how to get rid of the bargaining trap and ensure that the restriction of
offers to surplus shares is without loss for determining the set of equilibrium outcomes.
This obtains by augmenting the protocol to allow any party responding to an offer to
also irreversibly exit and thereby end the bargaining, i.e., by adding a unilateral exit
option. One way of interpreting the bargaining trap and its “fix” is therefore as pointing
out an omission in Rubinstein (1982). However, and potentially more importantly, the
results of this short paper shall open the door to further theoretical developments in
bargaining theory with haggling costs, which have long been considered a key element
to the theory of the firm (see Hart, 2008).4
3Both delay-cost formulations are considered in the literature on search and matching; e.g., see
Chade (2001) or Atakan (2006) for fixed costs, and Burdett and Coles (1997), Shimer and Smith
(2000), or Atakan and Ekmekci (2014) for discounting. The equivalence pointed out here relies on the
absence of randomization, however.
4A recent experimental study by Gago (2019) establishes the existence of significant psychological
haggling costs, and his finding that women perceive greater such costs than men is well in line with the
literature relating gender inequality to wage bargaining (see, e.g., the book by Babcock and Laschever,
2003).
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2 The Bargaining Trap, and How to Get Rid of It
2.1 Basic Model
Seller S and buyer B bargain over the price p at which S sells an indivisible good to
B. The good is worth vi to individual i ∈ {S,B}, where vB − vS ≡ K > 0, so there are
social gains from trade. Bargaining takes place according to the standard alternating-
offers protocol: In any of possibly infinitely many discrete bargaining periods, one party
i is the proposer and offers a price p, and the other party j 6= i is the respondent, who
then either accepts the offer (the game ends with this price agreement) or rejects it; in
this case, bargaining continues to the next period, where j becomes the proposer and i
becomes the respondent, and so on, until agreement. (We will consider both cases for
who gets to make the initial offer.)
Preferences over agreements (p, t) on a price p and with a delay of t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
bargaining periods are represented by the utility functions
US (p, t) = (p− vS)− cS · t and UB (p, t) = (vB − p)− cB · t;
i.e., the two individuals perceive a fixed cost ci > 0 per bargaining period (more pre-
cisely, per disagreement period), and we will focus on the case where cS < cB < K
(inviting the reader to think of them as small). Note that for preferences to be well-
defined on the space of all possible bargaining outcomes, including perpetual disagree-
ment as the least preferred outcome, we need to extend the utility range by {−∞}.
If we were to restrict price offers p to [vS, vB], we would obtain a special case of
Rubinstein (1982).5 However, since p is simply a monetary transfer, we relax this
(and only this) restriction here and allow for any p ∈ [vS − l, vB + l], where l ≥ 0
is a parameter of the game. We consider pure subgame-perfect equilibrium—in what
follows, simply “equilibrium”—and we call any subgame starting with individual i’s
offer, all of which are formally identical due to the stationarity of both the protocol and
preferences, “i-game.”
5Divide Ui by K to obtain xi (p) − (ci/K) · t, which maintains fixed bargaining costs, but where
xi : [vS , vB ]→ [0, 1] translates any price offer into i’s surplus share; xS is linearly increasing in p, and
xS (p) + xB (p) = 1 for any p ∈ [vS , vB ].
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2.2 The Bargaining Trap
Proposition 1. For any value l ≥ 0, equilibrium of both the S- and the B-game is
unique, with the following outcome: In the S-game, S offers the maximal possible price
vB+ l ≡ pS (l), and B accepts; in the B-game, B offers the price pS (l)−cS ≡ pB (l) and
S accepts. As l →∞, in both the S- and the B-game the equilibrium payoffs (U∗S, U∗B)
approach (+∞,−∞).
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile (defined for both games): S always offers
pS (l) and accepts an offer p if and only if p ≥ pB (l); B always offers pB (l) and accepts
an offer p if and only if p ≤ pS (l), i.e., B accepts any possible offer. Clearly, S has
no profitable deviation. Note then that B’s rejection as respondent results in payoff
vB−pB (l)− cB = −l+ cS− cB < −l, and since −l ≤ vB−p for any p ∈ [vS − l, vB + l],
she will indeed accept any offer; given that, B’s offer of pB (l) is optimal. The associated
equilibrium payoffs (U∗S, U∗B) are (K + l,−l) in the S-game and (K + l − cS,−l + cS)
in the B-game, and both converge to (+∞,−∞) as l→∞.
It only remains to show that the above is the unique equilibrium. First, note that
perpetual disagreement cannot be an equilibrium: Taking the i-game, the maximal
possible rejection payoff of respondent j 6= i is bounded, so there are prices that she will
always accept (irrespective of whatever complicated continuation outcome may arise)
and that yield proposer i a payoff that is bounded from below and hence greater than
that of −∞ under perpetual disagreement. (For instance, if j = S then her maximal
possible rejection payoff equals pS (l)−vS−cS, so she will always accept offers p > pB (l),
implying that i = B’s payoff cannot be less than vB − pB (l) = −l + cS.)
Second, define Ai as the set of pairs (p, t) that are equilibrium (agreement) outcomes
of the i-game, and let U i ≡ sup {Ui (p, t) : (p, t) ∈ Ai} and U i ≡ inf {Ui (p, t) : (p, t) ∈ Ai}.
Given the above equilibrium, the latter are well-defined, because Ai 6= ∅; moreover,
US = K + l and UB = −l + cS. Now define q and r such that UB ≡ vB − q and
US ≡ r − vS, respectively, so respondent B accepts any price p < q + cB, in any equi-
librium, and respondent S rejects any price p < r− cS, in any equilibrium. Accounting
for vS − l ≤ p ≤ vB + l,6 this implies that
r ≥ min {q + cB, vB + l} and q ≥ max {r − cS, vS − l} . (1)
6For the second inequality, additionally note that the buyer’s supremum value over delayed equi-
librium agreements cannot exceed that over immediate equilibrium agreements.
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If q + cB ≤ vB + l, then r ≥ q + cB ≥ max {r − cS + cB, vS − l + cB}, which implies
that r ≥ r − cS + cB. Since cB > cS, this is impossible. Hence, q + cB > vB + l must
hold true. This, however, implies that US = US = K + l, from which uniqueness of the
above equilibrium follows.
As soon as the buyer’s bargaining costs are greater than the seller’s, even by the
tiniest amount, the buyer will be exploited to the maximal possible degree by the seller.
Bargaining, though efficient (see Coase, 1960), becomes a trap for the buyer. Indeed,
upon anticipating this outcome, the buyer will choose to avoid the transaction to begin
with, regardless of how much surplus is thereby forgone, which is strongly inefficient.7
Intuitively, for every bargaining period that i proposes she gets to extract j’s cost
of rejecting cj, and given cS < cB, S ends up extracting cB − cS for every two periods,
which becomes arbitrarily large with an infinite horizon. The problem the buyer faces
is that the only way for her to get out of the bargaining is to accept the seller’s offer,
or make an offer the seller will accept. The seller with her lower bargaining costs will
strategically exploit this dependence and make the buyer’s way out maximally costly.
Though extreme, it captures why some people steer clear of the bazaar.
2.2.1 A Collective Bargaining Trap
The case of cB < cS < K adds nothing new, of course: Equilibrium is then simply
the mirror image of the case dealt with above, so that B gets to maximally exploit
S. However, the case of equal costs cS = cB ≡ c < K adds another stark result
about the bargaining trap, namely that there exists an (non-stationary and non-unique)
equilibrium in which both parties are worse off than by not transacting at all!
To begin with, and hardly surprisingly, the well-known multiplicity of stationary
equilibria from Rubinstein (1982, Conclusion I), all of which are efficient, extends to
the larger price range: Taking any price pS ∈ [vS − l + c, vB + l], the strategy profile
such that S always offers pS, B accepts an offer p if and only if p ≤ pS, B always
offers pB = pS − c (note that pB ∈ [vS − l, vB + l − c]), and S accepts an offer p if
and only if p ≥ pB constitutes a stationary equilibrium. (The set of such equilibria
is obtained by varying pS in the range.) Based on this multiplicity, we also obtain
non-stationary equilibria in which agreement is inefficiently delayed. Allowing for the
7While reminiscient of the hold-up problem—see, e.g., Che and Sákovics (2008)—here the invest-
ment is to engage in bargaining itself, and the seller would benefit from committing to a “fair” price.
Relatedly, see Anderlini and Felli (2006).
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larger price range, delay is supported to an extent that not only destroys the entire
surplus but, on top of that, makes both individuals pay for the bargaining. The key in-
centive constraint—following the parsimonious construction of Schweighofer-Kodritsch
(2018a) with extreme threats—is that, when proposing earliest on the path of such an
equilibrium, following it (by making a rejected offer) must yield i at least U i, which
here equals −l + c for both individuals. We can then show that the maximal delay
(for which a price exists so that both incentive constraints can be satisfied) equals the
largest integer weakly less than t∗ (l) ≡ 1
c
·
(
l + 12 · (K − c)
)
, and this approaches +∞
as l does so (cf. Schweighofer-Kodritsch, 2018b). Since the minimal delay required for
total delay costs to (weakly) exceed the entire surplus is the smallest integer weakly
above t̂ ≡ 1
c
· 12 ·K, this stark possibility of “haggling away” all surplus in equilibrium
arises whenever t∗ (l) ≥ t̂⇔ l ≥ 2c. As c becomes small, this is satisfied for any l > 0.
2.2.2 Time Preferences vs. Haggling Costs
What is the key characteristic of preferences that gives rise to the bargaining trap? To
begin with, it is worthwhile pointing out that the preferences studied here actually have
an exponential-discounting representation, namely
US (p, t) = δtS · exp (p− vS) and UB (p, t) = δtB · exp (vB − p) ,
where δi ≡ exp (−ci) ∈ (0, 1). In fact, this is true for any preferences of the form
u (m)− c · t, since any positive monotonic transformation preserves ordinal preferences
(in particular, taking the exponential, or the natural logarithm as its inverse). Hence,
we have here no departure from the benchmark model of “rational” delay discounting.
Instead, the key characteristic of preferences is their departure from “pure” time
preferences: Our bargainers are not indifferent as to the timing of getting nothing,
whereby merely waiting for a monetary reward is different from bargaining to get it.
A strict preference for getting nothing sooner rather than later, together with the
dependence on the other’s agreement in order even to get nothing is what gives rise to
the bargaining trap. With preferences of the form δt ·u (m), this means that u (0) > 0.8
A decision-maker with u (0) = 0 would be perfectly patient about getting nothing of the
surplus; given an opponent who is impatient about getting something, she must at least
8In order to be well-defined, the logarithmic transformation that yields the bargaining-costs rep-
resentation requires even more, namely that infm∈M u (m) ≥ 0 for M the possible range of monetary
rewards, which may include very low (negative) amounts.
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get that. With u (0) > 0, however, she is impatient about ending the bargaining for its
own sake, i.e., she experiences haggling costs. Letting ε ≡ u (0) and ũ (m) ≡ u (m) −
u (0), we can write δt · u (m) ≡ δt · (ũ (m) + ε), with ũ satisfying that ũ (0) = 0. Hence,
we can interpret these preferences as consisting of a standard “pure” time preferences
component δt · ũ (m) and an additional psychological component δt · ε. This latter
component depends solely on how long it takes to reach agreement, it is positive and
declines exponentially with delay. What appears as fixed bargaining costs under the
logarithmic transform, is here a delay discounted fixed benefit, a “joy” of agreement.
We conclude this discussion with a simple alternative example of the bargaining trap,
based on the above separation. It shows that the bargaining trap is bound to arise for
ε > 0 against a sufficiently patient opponent. Suppose that US (p, t) = δtS · (p− vS)
and UB (p, t) = δtB · ((vB − p) + ε), for some ε > 0, to be thought of as small. These
are preferences as in the basic textbook version of the Rubinstein (1982) model, where
instantaneous utility is linear in money and discounted exponentially (e.g., Muthoo,
1999), except that here the buyer additionally experiences a (small) joy of agreement ε.
This impatience about agreeing in addition to impatience about the material agreement
introduces bargaining costs. Standard arguments deliver the unique (and stationary)
equilibrium, which, for l > 0 sufficiently large, has the seller initially offer the price
pS (ε) =
(1− δB) · vB + δB · (1− δS) · vS
1− δBδS
+ (1− δB) · ε1− δBδS
,
and the buyer accept this offer, as the largest acceptable price. The first term on
the right-hand side is the usual equilibrium agreement pS (0): In terms of shares xi
of the material surplus K for each individual, it equals the division such that xS =
1− xB = 1−δB1−δBδS . The second term that adds to the seller’s price is due to the buyer’s
additional cost of disagreement. Overall, the price pS (ε) strictly exceeds vB if and
only if ε
K
> δB ·(1−δS)1−δB . Hence, however close ε > 0 and δB < 1 are to zero and one,
respectively, as δS → 1, the buyer finds herself in the bargaining trap, paying dearly
for her joy of agreement.9 In this sense, the basic model’s predictions are not robust to
introducing small costs of bargaining/disagreement.
9Formally, this example is identical to having the buyer value the good at vB + ε and the surplus
therefore equal to K + ε. Since pS (ε) ≤ vB + ε ⇔ K + ε ≥ 0 holds true for any (δS , δB) ∈ (0, 1)2,
there is no bargaining trap under this alternative interpretation. However, this is not a matter of mere
interpretation: Eliciting the buyer’s willingness to pay for the good via a “market” mechanism, such
as the widely applied Becker, DeGroot, and Marschak (1964) mechanism, would yield vB rather than
vB + ε.
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2.3 How to Get Rid of the Bargaining Trap
In view of the intuition given to Proposition 1, it seems clear that exit options during
the bargaining would remove the bargaining trap and restore that it will be solely about
the surplus. Especially if one considers the bargaining trap a mere theoretical curiosity
pointing towards an omission from the Rubinstein (1982) model, adding such an exit
option should result in the set of equilibrium outcomes being identical to that when
exogenously restricting offers to surplus shares. However, as shown by Ponsati and
Sákovics (1998), for the basic version of Rubinstein’s model, equilibrium outcomes are
rather sensitive to the way exit options are being introduced (see also Shaked, 1994,
regarding general outside options, and the related work by Avery and Zemsky, 1994).
As the final result, I therefore propose a concrete such “fix” to the protocol. For
simplicity, I formulate and prove it for the model with fixed bargaining costs studied
above, though it shall become clear that it “works” in generality. The concrete fix is to
augment the protocol with unilateral exit options of irreversibly quitting and thereby
ending the bargaining with no further transaction for both parties (S retains the good,
and no monetary transfers are made), as an action available to a respondent, in addition
to accepting or rejecting. Formally, if individual i takes her exit option in period t+ 1
after t disagreement periods, then her utility equals 0− ci · t, and that of j 6= i equals
0− cj · t. At the time of exiting, the cost of previous disagreement is sunk, and taking
the exit option is equivalent to not transacting at all. I term this an exit rather than an
outside option, because it has this specific nature, whereas outside options may refer
to various opportunities outside the relationship.
Proposition 2. Suppose that both individuals i ∈ {S,B}, whenever responding to an
offer, may also irreversibly exit the bargaining and thereby end it without any further
transaction. Then, for any value l ≥ 0, equilibrium of both the S- and the B-game is
unique, with the following outcome: In the S-game, S offers the price pS ≡ vB, and B
accepts; in the B-game, B offers the price pB ≡ pS − cS, and S accepts.
Proof. Consider the following strategy profile, defined for both games: S always offers
pS and responds to an offer p with acceptance if p ≥ pB and rejection if p < pB;
B always offers pB and responds to an offer p with acceptance if p ≤ pS and exits
if p > pS. Clearly, S has no profitable deviation. Note then that B’s rejection as
respondent results in payoff vB − pB − cB = cS − cB < 0 and is therefore less than the
zero payoff from exit; since vB − p ≥ 0 for any p ≤ pS, she will indeed accept any such
offer; given that, B’s offer of pB is optimal.
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To prove that this is the unique equilibrium, observe that the availability of exit
options implies U i ≤ K , which in turn implies U i ≥ cj (recall here that cj < K for
either j). The above equilibrium then yields that US = K and UB = cS. Following the
line of proof of Proposition 1, we now obtain
r ≥ min {q + cB, vB} and q ≥ max {r − cS, vS}
instead of the inequalities in (1). A similar argument then yields uniqueness of the
above equilibrium.
Introducing this exit option, the unique equilibrium is essentially the same regardless
of the value of l, and its outcome is that S captures the entire surplusK as proposer, but
no more. (Accordingly, B captures only S’s cost of disagreement cS < K as proposer.)
The bargaining trap is removed, and the restriction of bargaining offers to surplus
divisions becomes without loss, so that the same equilibrium outcome as in Rubinstein
(1982) obtains.
Of course, it would also be sufficient to only add an exit option for the buyer, and
only the first time that the seller makes her an offer. It should be clear, however, that
the proposed “fix” is general, beyond the basic model for which is formulated. Not only
does it maintain symmetry and stationarity of the protocol, but the fact that every
equilibrium outcome is now guaranteed to be individually rational together with the
outside option principle (Binmore, Shaked, and Sutton, 1989) imply that, given very
general preferences, the sets of equilibrium outcomes under the bargaining protocol
where (i) offers are restricted to surplus shares and there are no exit options, and under
the alternative one where (ii) offers are unrestricted and there are exit options as above,
will coincide.
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